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2Introduction
One university; two trials; two district court outcomes:  such is the case of the 
University of Michigan and the divergent court opinions regarding the inclusion of race 
as a factor in undergraduate and law school admissions.  In the case of Gratz v. 
Bollinger,2  the district court ruled in favor of race conscious admissions at the 
undergraduate level; however, in Grutter v. Bollinger,3  the district court struck down the 
policy at the law school.  In the wait between the district court opinions in the Michigan 
cases and the Supreme Court’s decisions, reversing the outcomes of the district courts, a 
question of legal principle hung in the balance: can diversity in collegiate class 
composition ever be a sufficiently compelling goal to permit the use of racial 
classifications in the admissions process?  After declining review in the cases of 
Hopwood v. State of Texas 4 and Smith v. Washington, 5 the Supreme Court heard the 
Michigan cases in what may be one of the most significant civil rights decisions by the 
Rehenquist Court.  In these cases, the Court formally endorsed race-conscious 
admissions.  Thus, race conscious admissions policies are constitutionally permissible, so 
long as they are narrowly tailored towards advancing compelling goals.  These goals 
include the pursuit of the educational benefits yielded through a diverse student body.   In 
2 Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F.Supp. 2d 811 (MI 2000), cert. granted, 537 U.S. 1044 (2002), decided, 
539 U.S. 244 (2003).
3 Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F.Supp. 2d 821 (MI 2001), 288 F.3d 732 (6th Circ. 2002), cert. granted, 
537 U.S. 1043 (2002), decided, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
4 Hopwood v. State of Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
5 Smith v. University of Washington, 233 F.3d 188 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1051 
(2001).
3this vein, the Court fully embraced the diversity rationale as proffered by Justice Powell 
in Bakke v. Board of Regents6 and followed by educational institutions for the last 
twenty-five years.  
The present inquiry focuses on identifying a potential relationship between the 
introduction of social science evidence at trial and judicial assessment of the costs and 
benefits of diversity, within the educational context.  Given the politically charged nature 
of the affirmative action debate, with many people having entrenched, diametrically 
opposed views, 7 and the relative novelty of social science on the costs and benefits of 
diversity, it may be the case that the influence of social science evidence is limited.  As 
the expenditures of the University of Michigan on expert witnesses throughout the course 
of the Michigan cases were considerable,8 it is appropriate to assess, in a pragmatic 
sense, the degree to which such expenditures are warranted.  In short, does employment 
of expert witnesses increase the likelihood for college and university defendants in race 
conscious admissions suits?  
6 University of California Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
7
 See Harold J. Spaeth & Jeffrey A. Segal, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY WILL: 
ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (1999), pp. 235-6, (looking 
specifically at affirmative action).  See generally, Spaeth & Segal, at 18-19, 308-311 (arguing that in highly 
salient cases justices are less likely to adhere to precedent; citing Justice Scalia’s quotation of Justice 
Douglass in South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 825 (1989), “’[a] judge looking at a constitutional 
decision may have compulsions to revere past history and accept what was once written. But he remembers 
above all else that it is the Constitution which he swore to support and defend, not the gloss which his 
predecessors may have put on it.’ Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 735, 736 (1949).”
8 The Associated Press reports that expenditures on the Gratz and Grutter cases cost the 
University of Michigan total $9 million.  Associated Press, Admissions Lawsuits Cost U-M $9 Million, THE 
DETROIT NEWS, March 22, 2003, at http://www.detnews.com/2003/schools/0303/27/schools-115479.htm.  
Most of the costs were associated with attorney’s fees, as Lee Bollinger specifically sought counsel with 
significant experience of success before the Supreme Court.  Costs would have been much higher had the 
University not received discounts from outside counsel.  In addition, many of the experts for the University 
waived compensation.  Janet Miller, U-M Suit Cost Already $9 Million: University-Owned Insurance 
Company Covering Affirmative Action Case’s Legal Expenses – Most for Outside Counsel, ANN ARBOR 
NEWS, March, 21, 2003 at http://aad.english.ucsb.edu/docs/umsuit2.html. 
4In Part II, I briefly review the landscape of equal protection law between the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Bakke and Grutter.  Part III presents an analysis of the role 
of social science evidence in race conscious admissions cases, utilizing a set of district 
and circuit court decisions arising between Bakke and Grutter.  Here I compare the 
outcomes of these decisions with the presence or absence of social science evidence at 
trial, utilizing a set of race conscious admissions cases spanning K-12 and higher 
education.  Part IV concludes with the assessment of the role of social science evidence 
in the outcome of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Gratz and Grutter.  
II. The Landscape of Race Conscious Admissions Cases From Bakke to Grutter
A. Jurisprudential Divisions Over Strict Scrutiny and the Bakke Decision
From the late 1970s into the early 1990s the Supreme Court issued a series of 
decisions, shaping the broader contours of equal protection law with respect to the 
permissibility of affirmative action policies in both purpose (compelling interest) and 
policy form (narrow tailoring).9 This period is marked by jurisprudential battles over the 
9 Black’s Law Dictionary defines affirmative action as, “[a] set of actions designed to eliminate 
existing and continuing discrimination, to remedy lingering effects of past discrimination, and to create 
systems and procedures to prevent future discrimination.”  Bryan A. Garner, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 64 
(8th ed. 2004).  The Modern Dictionary for the Legal Profession goes so far as to state that “[t]the 
constitutionality of many of these programs is uncertain because the programs themselves may 
impermissibly discriminate.” Gerry W. Beyer, Kenneth R. Redden, and Margaret Beyer, Eds., THE 
MODERN DICTIONARY FOR THE LEGAL PROFESSION, 20 (2001). Within the context of this paper, a broader 
conception of affirmative action will be used as the focus of this inquiry is not to address past 
discrimination, but the use of race conscious admissions to gain the benefits of a racially diverse student 
body.  For purposes of a working definition of affirmative action, this paper draws upon an alternative 
definition articulated by Catharine R. Stimpson, Dean of the Graduate School of Arts and Science New 
5issues of the appropriate standard of review for benign race conscious policies, strict 
versus intermediate scrutiny, and whether the standard of review should vary given the 
level of government, federal versus state and local.  Of concern is the burden accorded 
the defendant governmental entities when employing race conscious measures.  Given 
our nation’s history of de jure segregation and other invidious racially and ethnically 
targeted measures, the Court is inherently suspicious of measures including terms 
designating people along racial/ ethnic lines.  While the Court’s heightened suspicion 
protects individuals against direct discrimination by the government, it also constrains the 
flexibility of governmental entities in addressing the lingering effects of past injustices 
and aiding the building of an inclusive, pluralistic society.10
Historically, strict scrutiny has meant the death knell of any policy to which it is 
applied, with few exceptions.11  Strict scrutiny requires that the government prove that its 
interest in the proffered policy - the goal the government seeks - is compelling.  In 
York University, in the March/ April 1993 edition of Change magazine.  According to this definition, 
affirmative action is
[a]n umbrella term for a broader set of activities that public and private 
institutions have voluntarily undertaken in order to increase diversity, 
equity, and opportunity. Here, affirmative action is an institutional 
policy and spirit. Affirmative action so defined also embodies two 
strategies for the achievement of its goals. One is to erase inequities, for 
example, to fund both men's and women's athletics fully, without cavil. 
The second is to create a community that prizes diversity and 
differences.” Catharine R. Stimpson, Rethinking Affirmative Action, 25 
CHANGE 2 (1993).
10
 See, Kim Forde-Mazuri, The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action, 88 
GEORGETOWN L.J. 2232, 2340-2346 (2000).
11
 Until Grutter v. Bollinger, in all but one occasion, U.S. v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987), race-
based classifications did not survive strict scrutiny since the inception of the strict scrutiny concept in 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). The adage “strict in theory, but fatal in fact” was coined 
by Gerald Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal 
Protection. 86 HARVARD L. REV. 1 (1972).  For a further discussion of the effects of strict scrutiny see M. 
L. Manuel, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena: Is Strict Scrutiny Fatal in Fact for Governmental 
Affirmative Action Programs, 31 NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW 975 (1997).
6addition the nexus between the goal sought and the policy enacted must be tight and 
direct, what the Court calls narrowly tailored.  In effect, under strict scrutiny the burden 
between protecting innocent third parties and addressing injustice and/ or promoting 
diversity is thrown in favor of the innocents and protecting targeted classes from the 
perverse effects of benign policies.12  Traditionally, the standard of intermediate scrutiny 
is more lenient, albeit slightly, requiring the government to show merely that the 
proffered goal is important and that there is a substantial relationship between that goal 
and the policy.13
12
 See Forde-Mazuri, supra note 10 at 2359-2364.
13
 The Supreme Court in Frontiero v. Richardson  announced that a heightened standard was 
necessary when reviewing sex-based classifications. 411 U.S. 677, 93 S. Ct. 1764 (1973)(invalidating a 
military rule which permitted servicemen to automatically claim their spouses as dependents, but required 
servicewomen to prove that their spouses were dependent in fact).  However, it wasn’t until three years 
later, in Craig v. Boren, when the Supreme Court articulated the intermediate scrutiny standard as we have 
come to know it. 429 U.S. 190, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976)(invalidating an Oklahoma law denying 18 year old 
men from purchasing 3.2% beer, but allowing the purchase of such beer by young women of the same age).
Note that the above text provides the “black letter” discussion of the tiers of scrutiny as enunciated 
by the Supreme Court.  However, the Court’s practice often deviates from the proffered standards.  
According to University of California Professor Ashutosh Bhagwat, 
despite its sweeping embrace of the concept of tiered review, the 
Supreme Court has paid essentially no attention to the practical details 
of that review. … [T]he Court has failed to develop any coherent 
framework regarding how, in applying the tiers of scrutiny, courts are 
to assess whether the governmental interest asserted satisfies the 
requirements of the level of scrutiny at issue. Affirmative Action and 
Compelling Interests: Equal Protection Jurisprudence at the 
Crossroads, 4 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 260, 270 (2002).
Finding a pattern of review, Randall Kelso, Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law, argues that the 
Court employs a base plus six levels of heightened scrutiny (a base of rational basis review, plus two levels 
of heightened rational basis review, two levels of intermediate scrutiny and two tiers of strict scrutiny), 
reflecting variations in the level of review and the nexus between the policy and governmental interest.  In 
addition to those seven levels of review, three additional tiers could be added based on recent decisions 
adding language, such as the phrase “exceedingly persuasive” to intermediate scrutiny in the VMI decision. 
Standards of Review under the Equal Protection Clause and Related Constitutional Doctrines Protecting 
Individual Rights: The "Base Plus Six" Model and Modern Supreme Court Practice, 4 UNIVERSITY OF 
PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5 (2002).  Others have argued that the Court engages 
in an ad hoc balancing of interests, under the guise of heightened scrutiny.  See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard 
Cases and the (D)evolution of Constitutional Doctrine, 30 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW, 961 (1998) and 
7This abridged legal overview begins in 1978 with the Supreme Court’s decision in 
University of California Board of Regents v. Bakke.14 Bakke is a significant milestone 
when considering race conscious admissions as it is the first case in which the Supreme 
Court rendered a decision on the merits of race conscious admissions.15
The case of Allan Bakke began in 1973 when Bakke applied to the medical school 
at the University of California at Davis (UC-Davis).  The medical school scored applicant 
up to 500 points based on one’s grade point average (GPA), Medical College Admissions 
Test (MCAT) scores, letters of recommendation, extracurricular activities, and other 
biographical information.  While Bakke was thought to be a “very desirable applicant to 
[the] medical school”,16 his application was denied along with all other general 
admissions applicants with a score below 470.17
Concurrent with the general admissions procedure at UC-Davis Medical School 
was a special admissions procedure designed to increase the number of “disadvantaged” 
minorities at the school.  The special admissions procedure weighed candidates’ 
qualifications similar to that in the general admissions procedure, except that special
admissions candidates had to be of a racial minority background and prove social and/ or 
David L. Faigman, Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding - Exploring the Empirical Component of 
Constitutional Interpretation, 139 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW, 541 (1991).  Most 
recently scholars argue that the level of review employed in the Grutter decision was not strict, but 
intermediate scrutiny. See, e.g., Gail Heriot, Thoughts on Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger as 
Law and as Practical Politics, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 137 (2004).
14 Id. at 265 (1978).
15
 The first case was DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, which involved a race conscious policy 
at the University of Washington School of Law (1974).  That case was dismissed for mootness as the 
plaintiff’s graduation from the school of law was imminent at the time the case was heard by the Court.
16
 438 U.S.. at 276.
17 Id.
8economic disadvantage. In addition candidates needed to show they were not subject to 
the automatic 2.5 GPA cut off.18
In 1973 there were eight slots allotted for special admissions, four of which were 
unfilled at the time the medical school rejected Bakke’s application.  Bakke was neither 
considered for these slots, nor wait-listed.  Bakke mailed a letter to the Associate Dean 
and Chairman of the Admissions committee, Dr. George H. Lowrey, protesting the 
application process, stating that the special admissions procedure functioned as an illegal 
quota.19  Bakke reapplied in 1974 and his relative score dropped substantially to 549 out 
of 600.  Again, Bakke was rejected outright with seats in the special admissions program 
to spare, slots that were filled with students with significantly lower grade point averages 
and MCAT exam scores.20
Bakke filed suit with the Superior Court of California, seeking to compel his 
admission to UC-Davis, alleging that he was excluded from the school on the basis of his 
race in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d, and Article I of the California Constitution.  
The court ruled that the special admissions procedure acted as an illegal racial quota as it 
did not allow for the comparison of candidates from the special and general admissions 
pools.  However, the court stopped short of compelling Bakke’s admission, as Bakke had 
not proven that but for the quota he would have been admitted.21  Bakke appealed this 
18 Id. at 272-273.
19 Id. at 276.
20 Id. at 277.
21 Id. at 278-279.
9latter part of the decision directly to the California Supreme Court, which accepted, 
finding the issues raised in the case to be of significant import.22  The California Supreme 
Court assumed, arguendo, that the medical school’s goals of integrating the student body 
and thereby the medical profession, as well as improving minority healthcare, were 
compelling, but that the procedures employed were not narrowly tailored towards those 
goals.23  The court specifically stated, “no applicant may be rejected because of his race, 
in favor of another who is less qualified, as measured by standards applied without regard 
to race” and enjoined the school from using race as a factor in its admissions policies. 24
The Board of Regents appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  Writing for an 
equally divided court, Justice Powell affirmed the dissolution of the UC-Davis policy 
under the rubric of strict scrutiny, with the approval of Justice Stevens, Chief Justice 
Burger, Justices Stewart and Rehenquist, but reversed the decision insofar as it 
summarily banned affirmative action in admissions.  Justices Brennan, Marshall, 
Blackmun and White supported this latter action.  
Neither of the factions signed off on Powell’s benefits of a diverse student body 
justification for the use of race conscious admissions,25 which according to Powell 
22 See, Bakke v. The Regents of the University of California, 553 P. 2d 1152, 1156 (1976).
23 See Id. at 1165 (“The two major aims of the University are to integrate the student body and to 
improve medical care for minorities. In our view, the University has not established that a program which 
discriminates against white applicants because of their race is necessary to achieve either of these goals.”).
24 Id. at 1166.
25
 Justice Brennan later refers to the diversity in education justification in Metro Broadcasting
where he discusses Justice Powell’s opinion on diversity as if it was the proper statement of the law: 
Just as a “’diverse student body’” contributing to a ‘robust exchange of 
ideas’ is a ‘constitutionally permissible goal’” on which a race-conscious 
university admissions program may be predicated, Regents of University 
of California v. Bakke, [citations omitted] the diversity of views and 
information on the airwaves serves important First Amendment values. 
Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 568.
10
“clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education” as 
part of an institution’s academic freedom to encourage the “robust exchange of ideas” as 
protected by the First Amendment.  Citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents,26 Powell 
asserted that the belief that an atmosphere of “speculation, experiment and creation” is an 
essential quality of higher education is widely held and a student body that is diverse in 
its ideas and mores creates this atmosphere.  Students from different backgrounds 
“whether it be ethnic, geographic, culturally advantaged or disadvantaged – may bring to 
a professional school of medicine experiences, outlooks, and ideas that enrich the training 
of its student body and better equip its graduates to render with understanding their vital 
service to humanity.”27
How Justice Powell arrived at the conclusion that diversity serves a compelling 
purpose is unclear.  In Bakke he cited then Princeton President William Bowen’s editorial 
to Princeton alumni that discussed, without specific data analysis, the benefits of a 
diverse class.28 According to legal scholar and Dean of the University of Virginia School 
26 Keyishian involved a regulation requiring teachers at state universities in New York to pledge 
an oath that they had not engaged in treasonable or seditious conversation or acts.  The Supreme Court 
struck down the law as violating academic freedom as protected by the First Amendment. Keyishan, 385 
U.S. 589 (1967).
27 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314.
28 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314. In Bakke, briefs by amici, friends of the court, may have also played a 
role.  On the one hand, support for affirmative action in admissions was provided by the American Bar 
Association, the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People, the Association of American Law Schools, as well as the American Association for Medical 
Colleges, several universities and the National Council of Churches. Jewish organizations including the 
American Jewish Committee and the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith generally opposed the 
policy, given the history of the use of quotas to restrain Jewish American enrollments at elite institutions.  
The government weighed in as well with the second African American Solicitor General Wade McCree, 
the first being Thurgood Marshall, presenting a brief, written by conservative jurist then attorney Frank 
Easterbrook, which condemned the sixteen-seat set aside as per se unconstitutional.  Other parts of the 
Solicitor General’s brief reflected the office infighting and were generally dismissed by Justice Powell. For 
11
of Law, John Jeffries, a few years prior to the decision in Bakke, Justice Powell was 
recounted as being “doubtful of the educational policy” supporting the University of 
Washington Law School’s affirmative action policy challenged in DeFunis v. 
Odegaard.29  On the other hand, Powell found the policy within the institution’s 
purview.30
While Powell ultimately endorsed diversity as a valid policy goal, he did disagree 
as to the mechanics of the UC-Davis policy.  Instead he offered the admissions policy of 
Harvard, the “Harvard Plan”, as a counter factual to the Davis policy.  While employing 
the same aims, the Harvard Plan took into account a plethora of factors of which race was 
but one, a “racial plus”.  In addition, all students were considered for all seats.31
According to Jefferies, holding out the Harvard Plan was a pragmatic strategy.  Thus, 
while the ends of the UC-Davis and Harvard approaches may have been similar, the 
rigidity of the UC-Davis policy gave the appearance of blatant discrimination by 
institutions.32 In Powell’s own words, 
[i]t has been suggested that an admissions program which 
considers race only as one factor is simply a subtle and more 
sophisticated -- but no less effective -- means of according 
racial preference than the Davis program. A facial intent to 
discriminate, however, is evident in petitioner's preference 
program and not denied in this case. No such facial infirmity 
exists in an admissions program where race or ethnic 
more information on Justice Powell’s thoughts on race conscious admissions see John Jeffries, JUSTICE 
LEWIS F. POWELL, JR., 455-501 (1994).
29
 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
30
 Jeffries, supra note 28 at 461.
31 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316-318.
32
 Jeffries, supra note 28 at 484-485.  
12
background is simply one element -- to be weighed fairly 
against other elements -- in the selection process.33
Until the 1990s, general consensus among colleges and universities indicated that 
Powell’s approach was in fact the opinion of the Court and hence race conscious 
admissions became a national norm.  
B. Equal Protection Jurisprudence Post-Bakke
Throughout the eighties and into the nineties, divisions over the appropriate 
standard of review remained.  In 1980 the Court in Fullilove v. Klutznick upheld a 
congressionally-sponsored program awarding ten-percent of all federal construction 
projects to minority contractors.34  While a majority of six members of the Court 
supported this conclusion, this majority was divided equally as to whether benign race 
conscious measures should be subjected to strict or intermediate scrutiny.  
Within the education context, the Court in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education
struck down a collective bargaining agreement that included a race-conscious stipulation 
to prevent the loss of faculty diversity in the case of a layoff.35  The stipulation provided 
that in the event of lay-offs, they would occur on the basis of seniority, except that the 
percentage of minority teachers laid-off could not exceed the percentage of minority 
teachers employed at the time of the layoff.  In 1986 the Court in five separate opinions, a 
33 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318.
34
 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
35
 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
13
majority of the Court struck down the provision as violating the equal protection clause.  
However, there is no singular rationale from the court on this matter.
Germane to the issue of race conscious admissions, Justice O’Connor in Wygant 
acknowledged the confusion generated by the Court’s split, but confirmed support for the 
idea that under appropriate conditions race conscious policies generally, admissions 
policies in particular, are constitutional.  She writes, “although its precise contours are 
uncertain, a state interest in the promotion of racial diversity has been found sufficiently 
‘compelling,’ at least in the context of higher education, to support the use of racial 
considerations in furthering that interest.”36
One year after Wygant, in 1987, the Court held true to O’Connor’s dicta that race 
conscious policies were not per se illegal.   In U.S. v. Paradise 37 the Court upheld 
Alabama Department of Public Safety’s race conscious policy aimed towards remediating 
prior open and pervasive discriminatory conduct by the Department.  This is the first case 
in which a race-based classification survived strict scrutiny since the inception of the 
strict scrutiny concept in Korematsu v. United States.38
In 1989, the Court decided the case of City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., in 
which the City of Richmond, Virginia modeled its minority business program after the 
one upheld by the Court in Fullilove, allowing 30 percent of contracts to be awarded to 
minority firms.39  Here, the Court struck down the city’s policy requiring prime 
36 Id. at 286.
37
 480 U.S. 149 (1987).  
38
 323 U.S. 214 (1944). The next time would not be until 2003 when the Court decided Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
39
 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
14
contractors to subcontract to minority business enterprises, under the stringent standards 
of strict scrutiny.  Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, asserts that strict scrutiny is 
the appropriate standard of review for all racial classifications, insidious or benign, as 
applied to states and localities.  She reasons that it is difficult to assess governmental 
motivations and recites potential perverse effects stemming from ostensibly benign 
policies.40  The idea here is that, among other considerations, even when the government 
has the best of intents, it may be harming the targeted group by perpetuating negative 
stereotypes.41  The Court also found that while generally the remediation of the effects of 
past discrimination was valid, the second prong of strict scrutiny, narrow tailoring, was 
not satisfied, in part, for evidentiary reasons. 
The City of Richmond’s proffer of statistics, which confirmed that nationally 
there were disproportionately fewer minority contractors, failed to provide specific data 
regarding the state of minority contracting in Richmond.42  From the Court’s view, this 
seemed to be significant folly on the part of the City of Richmond.  Here the Court was 
looking for evidence documenting discrimination in awards of city contracts and/ or of 
disparities in awards along racial lines.43  With respect to the latter, the disparity would 
need to be evidenced by the compared ratios of contracts awarded to qualified minority 
40 Id. at 493-494.
41 Id.
42 See Id. at 487– 491(generally distinguishing the Court’s decision in Fullilove from the facts 
presented in Croson on federalism grounds) and id. at 500-503 (specifically focusing on the dearth of 
evidence germane to the issue of disparities in the award of city contracts to minority firms).  The Court 
seemed particularly concerned about the awarding of minority contracts in a city in which African 
Americans constituted about half of the population and held five of nine city council seats. Id. at 495-496.
43 Id. at 500.
15
firms versus contracts awarded to majority firms.44  The city’s data only compared the 
number of minority-awarded contracts to the general population and not to the pool of 
qualified minority contractors.  In addition, in terms of the award of minority contracts, 
the city allowed for any nationally underrepresented firm to apply, rather than those 
groups historically discriminated against in and around the City of Richmond.45
The next year, in 1990, the Court in Metro Broadcasting v. Federal 
Communications Commission applied intermediate scrutiny to a federal program, finding 
diversity in broadcasting an important governmental goal under the rubric of intermediate 
scrutiny.46  Five years later, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, the Court reversed. 47
The dispute in Adarand involved a federal construction contract, which included 
incentives for contractors to employ small, disadvantaged minority firms. Here, the 
Court announced that the appropriate standard for review for all race conscious measures
is strict scrutiny.
Writing for the majority once again, O’Connor specifically stated her desire to 
dispel the characterization of strict scrutiny as strict in theory, but fatal in fact.  However, 
in the one case she cites for this proposition, Paradise,48 she along with Justices 
Rehenquist and Scalia dissented from the majority’s approval of the state’s program to 
remediate open and pervasive discriminatory conduct by the Alabama Department of 
44 Id. at 501-502.
45 Id.
46
 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
47
 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
48
 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
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Public Safety.  It is not until O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger,49 upholding the 
Michigan Law School’s race conscious admissions policy, that she “makes good” on the 
Adarand  assertion, rendering the seemingly fatal impact of strict scrutiny a function of 
policy construction rather than application of strict scrutiny per se.
Majority opinions in both Adarand and Bakke rely on the strict scrutiny standard 
of review as a basis for analyzing the constitutionality of race conscious public policies. 
However, the burden of proof seems to have increased.  Whereas in Bakke, Justice 
Powell could in part anchor his diversity rationale William Bowen’s editorial to Princeton 
alumni; by Croson, the Court is looking for location and inquiry specific data.   In 
addition, between the deep divisions in the Court at the time of Bakke and the seventeen 
years of uneven, non-linear precedent by the Supreme Court, it became unclear how 
much of Powell’s opinion in Bakke was still a valid guide. 
General consensus among colleges and universities that Bakke remained “good 
law” was shattered in 1996, when the Fifth Circuit announced in its decision of Hopwood 
v. The State of Texas that racial diversity could never be a sufficient justification for race-
conscious admissions.  According to that court “diversity in higher education contradicts, 
rather than furthers, the aims of equal protection” and as such is contrary to the intended 
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment.50  While it was the first circuit to address the 
issue of race conscious admissions post-Bakke, the fifth circuit was hardly the last.  
The Hopwood decision ushered in a new wave of litigation over race conscious 
admissions.  At the turn of the century, from Hopwood to the Michigan cases, admissions 
49
 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
50 Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 945.
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policies at four public universities, the elite high schools of Boston, and transfer policies 
at several magnet schools were challenged for their explicit use of racial criteria.  
Without clear direction from the Supreme Court as to how Justice Powell’s framework 
for understanding race conscious admissions fit into the broader context of the legality of 
affirmative action under equal protection, district and circuit courts proceeded to handle 
the cases before them.   Expressing frustration over the confusion that emerged, Judge 
Wiener in his Hopwood concurrence stated
Between the difficulty inherent in applying Bakke and the 
minimal guidance in Adarand, the definition and 
application of the compelling interest inquiry seems to be 
suspended somewhere in the interstices of constitutional 
interpretation.  Until further clarification issues from the 
Supreme Court defining “compelling interest”  (or telling 
us how to know one when we see one), I perceive no 
“compelling” reason to rush in where the Supreme Court 
fears – or at least declines – to tread.51
The lack of clear Supreme Court guidance, to which Judge Wiener alludes, left district 
and circuit court judges on their own to parse the precedents before them.  A circuit split 
resulted.  
The circuit split emerged in 2002, when the sixth circuit in a 5-4 enbanc decision 
upheld the University of Michigan’s law school policy under Justice Powell’s guidelines 
established in Bakke.52  In this case, Grutter v. Bollinger, Barbara Grutter applied to the 
University of Michigan’s law school in 1996, with fairly strong qualifications: a 3.8 
undergraduate grade point average and an LSAT score of 161.   Her scores were strong 
51
 78 F.3d at 964-965.
52 Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002).
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enough to get her on the waitlist, but not enough to gain admittance.53  In a parallel case, 
Gratz v. Bollinger, Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher applied to the University of 
Michigan’s College of Literature, Arts and Sciences in 1995 and 1997, respectively.  
Gratz was informed that she was “well qualified,” but that “she was ‘less competitive 
than the students who had been admitted on first review.'"54  Hamacher’s scores also 
placed him within the range of qualified applicants, “they [were] not at the level needed 
for first review admission.”55  Both University of Michigan schools contained affirmative 
action policies that considered race as a factor in admissions decisions.  However, the 
policies took different approaches in making this consideration.
At the law school, the policy blended the use of: an index undergraduate grade 
point averages (UGPA) and law school admissions test scores (LSAT); consideration of 
other student characteristics, essays, enthusiasm of recommenders, quality of 
undergraduate institution, difficulty of undergraduate curriculum, and potential for 
unique contributions to intellectual and social life in law school.56  The undergraduate 
plan in Gratz, however, assigned specific point values with a maximum of 150 points.  
These point values were: academic factors (110 point maximum); 20 points for 
membership in an underrepresented minority group, socioeconomic disadvantage, 
attendance at a predominantly minority high school, athletics, or Provost discretion; as 
53 Grutter, 539 U.S. 306, 324.
54 Gratz, 539 U.S. 244, 249.
55 Id.
56 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324. 
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well as points for residency, legacy, personal achievement, essay, leadership, and 
service.57
At the district court, Judge Friedman in Grutter v. Bollinger found the law 
school’s policy to violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as he failed to find a 
compelling state interest in diversity.  Furthermore, as race neutral alternatives had not 
been exhausted, among other matters, Judge Friedman found the law school’s policy as 
failing to meet narrow tailoring standards.58  On the other hand, Judge Duggan in Gratz v. 
Bollinger generally found the principle of diversity compelling, relying on Bakke as 
precedent and the social science evidence presented at trial, upholding under summary 
judgment the undergraduate admissions policy in place for 1999 and 2000.59  Both 
decisions were appealed to the Sixth Circuit, where a majority reversed Judge Friedman 
in Grutter, upholding the law school’s policy.60   A decision on the undergraduate case, 
Gratz v. Bollinger, was not reached, however. 61
Amid controversy over procedural matters,62 the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
to both University of Michigan cases.  In 2003 the Supreme Court upheld the 
57
 See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 253-257 (detailing the undergraduate admissions policies from 1995 
through 2000).
58 Grutter, 137 F.Supp.2d at 872.
59 Gratz, 122 F.Supp.2d at 831. Prior policies, however, were found constitutionally infirm.  Id. at 
831-833, 836.
60
 288 F.3d at 752.
61
 Given the closeness of the issues in the Michigan cases, the Supreme Court agreed resolve both 
cases, granting certiorari before judgment in the Gratz case. Gratz, 537 U.S. 1044 (2002).
62
 The controversy over alleged procedural irregularities is detailed in the appendix to Judge 
Boggs’ dissent, Id. at 810-815, and is discussed in Sheryl G. Snyder, Gratz and Grutter in Context: A 
Comment on the Litigation Strategy, Judicial Politics and Political Context Which Produced Grutter and 
Gratz. 92 Ky. L.J. 241 (2003).
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constitutionality of narrowly tailored race conscious admissions policies aimed at 
advancing the educational benefits of diversity.63  While the Court found the university’s 
interest in advancing the educational benefits of diversity compelling in both cases, in the 
undergraduate case, Gratz v. Bollinger,64 the Court found that the policy was 
constitutionally infirm as it routinely applied a set amount of points, 20 out of 150, to 
racial and ethnic considerations.  This infirmity stemmed both from the weight of the 
consideration of race, one-fifth of the automatic admission cut off of 100 points, and the 
mechanical application of the points, comparable to the quota used by UC-Davis medical 
school in the Bakke case.65  By comparison, the law school policy at issue in Grutter v. 
Bollinger reviewed a broader array of factors to be considered individually when 
determining admissions decisions.  For that reason, among others, it was considered 
narrowly tailored and the least restrictive means for attaining a diverse student body.66
63 Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
64
 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
65 Id. at 272-274.
66
 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336 -343 for the majority’s opinion on the complicity of the law 
school’s plan with narrow tailoring.  For a fuller discussion of the Gratz and Grutter opinions see Lackland 
H. Bloom, Jr., Grutter and Gratz: A Critical Analysis, 41 Hous. L. Rev. 459 (2004).
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III. Social Science Evidence in Race Conscious Admissions Cases
A. The Evidentiary Question in Race Conscious Admissions Cases
The divergent approaches district and circuit court judges took in analyzing the 
constitutional validity of race conscious admissions policies provide a set of seventeen 
cases wherein one can explore the degree to which social science evidence is influential 
in the outcomes of these cases.  Four of these cases arise in the higher education 
context.67   The other thirteen are from K-12 voluntary desegregation cases.  Given the 
small number of higher education cases, the addition of K-12 cases helps to fill out the 
analysis. Furthermore, the general constitutional inquiry is parallel: whether or not 
diversity is a compelling governmental interest sufficient to justify race conscious 
integration plans.  
For purposes of this inquiry, the seventeen cases are subdivided to present the 
opinions of 47 district and circuit court judges.  Seven judges are excluded from the 
numerical counts presented in the table below, as they are decided on state law grounds.68
67
 Note that the case of Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994) is not included in this 
analysis as the context of Podberesky differs from other race conscious admissions cases in the field of 
education.  In particular, Podberesky arises in the context of financial aid, specifically race-specific 
scholarships.  While an offer of admissions and a financial aid award are tied to a students’ ability to enroll 
in a particular institution, the institutional decision to permit entry to the university and give financial aid 
are distinct.  The presence or absence of financial aid in this context renders it more likely that a student 
will attend a particular school, rather than enabling their ability to attend college at all.  Cf. Michael A. 
Olivas, Constitutional criteria: The social science and common law of admissions decisions in higher 
education. 68 COLORADO LAW REVIEW, 1065 (1997) arguing that the context of financial aid and 
admissions are tied, such that the financial aid consideration is part of the admissions decision from the 
perspective of an applicant.  
68
  Cases arising in the State of Washington were ultimately disposed of under Initiative 200 (I-
200), also known as the Washington State Civil Rights Initiative.  Implemented November 3, 1998, I-200 
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The decisions excluded include Ninth Circuit’s opinions in Smith v. University of 
Washington 69 and Parents Involved in Community Schools v. School Dist. No. 1 70 and 
the district court opinion in Smith.71 Also note that only one opinion per judge is included 
so as not to over-represent a particular judge’s approach to the cases.  For that reason 
Judge Gertner’s opinion in Boston’s Children First v. City of Boston,72 Judge Bryan’s 
opinion in Tito v. Arlington County School Board 73 and Judge Edenfield’s opinions in 
Tracy v. Board of Regents 74and Wooden v. Board of Regents,75 both involving 
admissions at the University of Georgia, are also excluded from the total count.  These 
cases are, however, noted in the analysis below.  The total number of judges included in 
the count is 40.
Overall, nearly two-thirds of all judges hearing race conscious admissions cases 
between Bakke and Grutter ruled in favor of plaintiff students, 25 out of 40.   Yet the 
odds of a judge ruling in favor of defendants improved relative to plaintiffs to about 50-
50 when social science evidence was presented at trial.  This happens as the odds of
states that: “the state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or 
group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, 
public education, or public contracting”.  WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60 (1998).  This initiative is modeled 
after California’s Proposition 209.
69
 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1051 (2001).
70
 285 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir. 2002). 
71
 2 F.Supp. 2d 1324 (WA 1998).
72
 62 F.Supp. 2d 247 (MA 1999).
73
 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7932 (VA 1997) (unpublished opinion).
74
 59 F.Supp. 2d1314 (GA 1999).
75
 32 F.Supp. 2d 1370 (GA 1999).
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Table 1 - Judicial Rulings for Plaintiffs and Defendants by the Presence or Absence of 
Social Science Evidence at Trial
Plaintiff
Wins
Defendant
Wins Total
Social Science Evidence 8 9 17
No Social Science Evidence 17 6 23
Total 25 15 40
of plaintiffs wins decreased from just over two-thirds (17 of 25) to one-third (8 of 25) 
when social science evidence was introduced and the odds of defendant wins increased 
by one-third.
Looking at the numbers from a legal analysis perspective, by definition, there are 
only plaintiff wins when judges find a compelling governmental interest in diversity. 
Thus the fifteen plaintiff wins represent the fifteen opinions in which these judges state 
that diversity is a compelling governmental interest.  On the other hand, only four judges 
find that as a matter of law, diversity is not compelling.76
In the majority of opinions, a total of 21 judges express uncertainty as to whether 
diversity is compelling. Generally, these courts raise two concerns:  the first concern is 
evidentiary; the second is legal. Identifying the legal question is rather straightforward.
The legal question regards the status of Justice Powell’s opinion as good law and 
whether courts should rely on that opinion.  For example, assuming Powell’s opinion was 
good law, the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits specifically withheld judgment on whether 
76
 These judges include two of the three circuit court judges in Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944 (“We 
agree with the plaintiffs that any consideration of race or ethnicity by the law school for the purpose of 
achieving a diverse student body is not a compelling interest under the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Judge 
Friedman in Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 850 (“The court does not doubt that racial diversity in the law 
school population may provide these educational and societal benefits. … Nonetheless, the fact remains 
that the attainment of a racially diverse class is not a compelling state interest because it was not recognized 
as such by Bakke...”); and, Judge Edenfield in the University of Georgia cases, Johnson, 106 F.Supp. 2d at 
1374-1375 (“[T]he "diversity" interest is so inherently formless and malleable that no plan can be narrowly 
tailored to fit it.”).
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the institutions proved that in their specific context diversity was compelling.  These 
courts then decided the cases of Johnson v. Board of Regents of the University of 
Georgia, 77 Tuttle v. Arlington County School Board,78 and Eisenberg v. Montgomery 
County Public Schools 79 on narrow tailoring grounds.80
The evidentiary question, however, is more intricate.  The compelling interest the 
Supreme Court found in the educational benefits of diversity is a question of law, 
supported by social facts.  While the Supreme Court has not given a bright-line rule 
signaling the distinction, the general guideline is that empirical inquiries, revolving 
around a specific set of events is an inquiry of fact.  For these cases, the trial court as 
finder of fact is best suited to assess facts presented at trial.  The overturning of such an 
assessment is only by an appellate court’s finding of clear error.81  However, questions in 
which an issue or policy centers “on the values society wishes to promote” along with 
questions requiring rote application of law are questions of law.82  Legal questions may 
77
 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001).
78
 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999).
79
 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999).
80
 Treatment of the narrow tailoring inquiry during this time between Bakke and Grutter is of 
independent import and is explored in Crystal Gafford Muhammad, Form or Substance: Does policy 
structure or rationale influence the constitutionality of race-conscious admissions policies?, a paper 
presented at the American Education Researcher Association’s Annual Conference (April 2003). 
81 See, Kelly Kunsch, Standard of Review (State and Federal): A Primer, 18 SEATTLE UNIVERSITY 
LAW REVIEW 11(1994).
82 Id. at 22.
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be mixed with factual inquiries, the mixture of which, for the purpose of maintaining a 
consistent system of laws, can be subjected to de novo review at the appellate level.83
For example, in the case of Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Board of 
Education the district court held that the Supreme Court wrongly assessed the facts in 
Brown v. Board of Education, and on the basis of the facts before the district court 
declared, “education is best given in separate schools.”84 As properly assessed by the 
Fifth Circuit in Stell, the Supreme Court in Brown issued a statement of law announcing 
the inherent inequality of segregation.  That law, however, was merely informed by the 
social science evidence presented.
As in the case of desegregation, the policy implications for the Court’s decisions 
in Gratz and Grutter are broad, impacting accessibility to eli te educational institutions 
and the propensity for the upward socioeconomic mobility of all Americans.   Thus, when 
Justice Powell stated that diversity serves a compelling purpose, it was a statement of 
law, referencing William Bowen’s Princeton alumni editorial.  That editorial discussed, 
without specific data analysis, the benefits of a diverse class.85
83 See Adam Hoffman, Corralling Constitutional Fact: De Novo Fact Review in the Federal
Appellate Court. 50 DUKE LAW JOURNAL 1427; See also, Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999); Bose 
Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984); and Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1962).
84 220 F. Supp. 667 (1963).
84 Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Board of Education, 333 F. 2d 55, 61 (5th Cir. 1964).  Note 
that the State of Georgia is now part of the Eleventh Circuit.
85 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314. According to legal scholar and Dean of the University of Virginia 
School of Law, John Jeffries, a few years prior to the decision in Bakke, Justice Powell was recounted as 
being “doubtful of the educational policy” supporting the University of Washington Law School’s 
affirmative action policy challenged in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).  On the other hand, 
Powell found the policy within the institution’s purview.  John Jeffries, JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR., 461 
(1994).
In Bakke, briefs by amici, friends of the court, may have also played a role.  On the one hand, 
support for affirmative action in admissions was provided by the American Bar Association, the American 
Civil Liberties Union, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the Association of 
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However, in interpreting Bakke and subsequent equal protection cases, district and 
circuit courts treated the matter as a question of fact, an evidentiary issue.  For example, 
the district court in Johnson v. Board of Regents of the University of Georgia held that 
diversity was not a compelling interest.86 In contrast to Justice Powell in Bakke, the 
district court was not convinced by testimony of former University of Georgia President 
Charles Knapp.87 Knapp testified on the basis of his experience as an administrator and 
professor that “college-age students benefit educationally and economically from 
interaction with peers drawn from diverse backgrounds and experiences” and that 
“student heterogeneity -- including, but not limited to racial diversity – contributes to 
education that also occurs inside the classroom.”  The district court described Knapp’s 
testimony as “speculation and syllogism.”88  The Eleventh Circuit also found the 
University of Georgia’s defense lacking sufficient evidence, including a lack of statistical 
support for the proposition that white candidates are not harmed at the middle tier of 
admissions review, the tier in which the racial benefit was applied.  The Court also cited 
the lack of documented consideration of race-neutral alternatives.89
American Law Schools, as well as the American Association for Medical Colleges, several universities and 
the National Council of Churches. Jewish organizations including the American Jewish Committee and the 
Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith generally opposed the policy, given the history of the use of 
quotas to restrain Jewish American enrollments at elite institutions.  The government weighed in as well 
with the second African American Solicitor General Wade McCree, the first being Thurgood Marshall, 
presenting a brief, written by conservative jurist then attorney Frank Easterbrook, which condemned the 
sixteen-seat set aside as per se unconstitutional.  Other parts of the Solicitor General’s brief reflected the 
office infighting and were generally dismissed by Justice Powell. For more information on Justice Powell’s 
thoughts on race conscious admissions see John Jeffries, JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR., 455-501 (1994).
86 Johnson, 106 F.Supp. 2d 1362, 1375 (GA 2000), aff’d, 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001).
87 Id. at 1371-1372.
88 Id.
89 Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1258-1259.
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Similarly, the district court judges in McLaughlin v. Boston School Committee,90
Equal Open Enrollment Association v. Board of Education,91 Wessmann v. Gittens,92
Brewer v. West Irondequoit Central School District,93 Boston’s Children First v. City of 
Boston,94 Comfort v. Lynn School Committee,95 and the other University of Georgia 
cases, Wooden 96 and Tracy v. Board of Regents of the University of Georgia,97 found the 
evidence presented insufficient to make a compelling case for diversity.  In four of these 
cases, McLaughlin, Equal Open Enrollment Association, Boston’s Children First, and 
Comfort, the evidentiary question arose during preliminary hearings.  As such, those 
judges rendered opinions on the basis of a truncated record, without the benefit of full 
discovery.   In the cases of Smith v. University of Washington 98 and Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,99 the Ninth Circuit suggested that if 
presented with appropriately supportive evidence, and in the absence of state law banning 
race conscious policies, that diversity may be found to be a compelling interest.100
90
 938 F.Supp. 1001 (MA 1996).
91
 937 F. Supp. 700 (OH 1996).
92
  996 F. Supp. 120 (MA 1998), aff’d, 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir.1998).
93
 32 F.Supp. 2d 619 (NY 1999).
94
 62 F.Supp. 2d 247 (MA 1999). 
95
 100 F.Supp. 2d 57 (MA 2000).
96
 32 F.Supp. 2d 1370 (GA 1999).
97
 59 F.Supp. 2d 1314 (GA 1999).
98
 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1051 (2001).
99
 285 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir. 2002). 
100 Initiative 200 (I-200) foreclosed the use of race conscious policies in the regular course of 
education in the State of Washington, the policy in Parents was found to be unlawful while the Smith case 
was rendered moot.  Consider the Ninth Circuit’s language in Parents:
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Yet, offering social science evidence did not guarantee a defendant win.  Hence, 
even with the benefit of expert testimony and a full record, the Boston Public School 
District did not prevail in the Wessmann case.101   In addition to Wessmann, defendants in 
Gratz and Grutter v. Bollinger, McLaughlin, Parents and Comfort offered scientifically 
informed testimony to support respectively the policy goals of diversity, the remediation 
of racial isolation, and de facto segregation.102   While the evidentiary issue was not 
dispositive in all of these cases, within this set, only two, Grutter and Comfort, ultimately 
permitted the continued use of the race conscious admissions policy in effect at the time 
of litigation.  At the level of individual judicial ruling, as listed in the table above, nine of 
seventeen did rule in favor of defendants when social science evidence was offered.  On 
the surface, it seems as if the fairly daunting odds of winning race conscious admissions 
suit are improved when social science evidence is employed. The next section further 
explores the role played by social science evidence in race conscious admissions 
decisions.
As federal judges, we are not charged with the arduous task of choosing between 
these competing policy choices on their merits. Indeed, "how we judges might 
weigh competing policy considerations is simply irrelevant." Rucker v. Davis, 
203 F.3d 627, 639 (9th Cir. 2000), rev'd en banc, 237 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2001), 
rev'd sub nom. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 122 S. Ct. 1230, 2002 
U.S. LEXIS 2144, 2002 WL 451887 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2001). Instead, our proper 
role is a limited one; we do not decide which choice is "better," but only whose 
choice controls. We conclude that, in this case, the will of the School District 
must give way to the will of the people of Washington.. Id. at 1252-1253. 
101
 160 F.3d at 808-809. (“While we appreciate the difficulty of the School Committee's task and 
admire the values that it seeks to nourish noble ends cannot justify the deployment of constitutionally 
impermissible means.”).
102
 An expert witness was employed in Equal Open Enrollment Association (1996), however, the 
evidence presented constituted alternatives to the race-conscious policy.
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B. The Role of Social Science Evidence in District and Circuit Court Judges 
Decisions
Empirical evidence on the benefits of diversity is a product of social science 
research on the effects of peers on student achievement and other educational, social, and 
economic outcomes.  While a relatively novel and growing body of literature, the gross 
majority of works support the proposition that diversity is an important component of 
broader educational strategies to provide optimal environments for teaching and learning.  
In addition, when diversity is nurtured, a diverse student environment fosters qualities 
within students, prompting them to reach out to others in society.103
At the cursory glance presented in Table 1, there seems to be some relationship 
between defendant wins and the presence of social science evidence at trial.  The reverse 
seems also true: there are more plaintiff wins when social science is not offered.  This 
result follows from the manner in which race conscious admissions cases are built.  
While plaintiffs bring the suit, defendant educational institutions use social science 
evidence as an affirmative defense as to why they specifically consider race when 
composing student bodies.104 Thus, the employment of social science evidence may 
proxy the enthusiasm with which the defense makes its case.  For example, as a result of 
the rally of defendant experts by Lee Bollinger, former president of the University of 
Michigan and named plaintiff in the Gratz and Grutter cases, the CIR recommended 
103
 For a review of the literature on the benefits of diversity, see Jeffrey F. Milem, The Educational 
Benefits of Diversity: Evidence from Multiple Sectors, in COMPELLING INTEREST: EXAMINING THE 
EVIDENCE ON RACIAL DYNAMICS IN HIGHER EDUCATION (Mitchell Chang et al. eds., 2003).
104 During my dissertation research, I had the opportunity to meet with Michael E. Rosman, 
attorney for the Center for Individual Rights (CIR), a conservative civil rights law firm which has played a 
major role in these law suits on the side of plaintiffs.  Rosman informed that rather than any concerted 
effort on the part of the CIR to gather a team of experts for plaintiffs in race conscious admissions trials, the 
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Kinley Larntz to testify on the behalf of plaintiffs.  No such employment of experts was 
used in either the Hopwood or Smith cases because defendants presented no social 
science evidence in those trials.  
It is difficult to disentangle whether the increase in defendant (educational 
institution) wins when social science evidence is introduced is attributable to the 
motivation of defendants or an “effect” of the data.  In either event, it does not seem to be 
the case that defendants are significantly more likely to win when social science evidence 
is presented.  What the addition of social science evidence seems to signal is a “fighting 
chance,” an opportunity for defendant institutions to put forth a case in which a 
reasonable judge could vote in favor.
Judges are not equally receptive to social science evidence, generally, and this 
receptivity varies across issues.  With regards to the present inquiry, there is least one 
judge whose opinion suggests that social science evidence in the context of race 
conscious admissions is irrelevant.  Judge Bryan in Tuttle declined to permit Arlington 
County to present evidence of the educational benefits of a diverse student body along 
with evidence that race conscious policies are the most efficient method of attaining that 
goal.  Bryan explicitly states “[t]he court already has before it sufficient evidence to rule 
on the merits … Even if racial classifications overwhelmingly increase the academic 
success of defendants’ educational program, they remain unconstitutional”.105  Other 
courts, such as the district court and Eleventh Circuit in Johnson, found the evidence 
before the court lacking.  
CIR treats cases individually and makes decisions with respect to the employment of experts for trial on a 
case-by-case basis.  
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Of the four cases asserting that diversity is not a compelling interest, social 
science evidence is presented in only one.  In that sole case, Judge Friedman waded 
through data presented by both the plaintiffs and defendants in Grutter, and focused on 
the statistical disparities in enrollment between whites and under-represented groups. 
Specifically, the court found that the Michigan Law School places too heavy an emphasis 
on race as an admissions factor.106  Using admissions statistics for the 1995-1996 school 
year as an illustration, the court contended that the law school’s attempt to compose a 
class that is racially representative of the applicant pool, violated its primary admission’s 
goal of admitting student with the highest undergraduate grade point averages (GPA) and 
LSAT exam scores given the significant gap between minority and non-minority 
scores.107  According to this line of reasoning, enrollment for minority groups should 
have been significantly less than their proportion in the applicant pool.108
Highlighting the disparities in admissions probabilities, Dr. Kinley Larntz, 
Professor Emeritus of the Department of Applied Statistics at the University of 
Minnesota, calculated the odds of admission for each racial group by LSAT and GPA
and found that the relative odds of admission were tens to hundreds of times greater if
one was not Caucasian.  Based on this evidence the court concluded that “[o]ne does not 
need to undergo sophisticated statistical analysis in order to see,” quoting Dr. Larntz, 
105
  1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS  at *12. Judge Bryan was also a bit perturbed that after he directly 
ordered the district, in Tito, to stop using race as a factor in admissions, Arlington Traditional School 
instituted a new policy, using race as a weight in selecting its student body by lottery.  
106 Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 840.
107 Id. at 841.
108 Id. at 182
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 “membership in certain groups is an extremely strong factor in the decision for 
acceptance”.109
Dr. Stephen Raudenbaush, Professor of Education at the University of Michigan 
and qualified by the court as an expert in statistics, found Dr. Larntz’s analysis flawed as 
it did not consider the “soft factors,” such as quality of the undergraduate institution 
(which may temper hard factors including grades and class rank), recommendations, and 
experience.  In fact, such “soft factors” may be determinant.  Dr. Larntz also excluded 
from his analysis episodes in which all students were rejected or all accepted, introducing 
bias at the high and low ends of the GPA-LSAT distribution.  In addition, as odds ratios 
varied across the GPA-LSAT distribution, the summation of the distribution used wasa 
not informative.110
The court rejected Raudenbush’s critique, finding that the grid itself revealed such 
disparities in the odds of admission and that a statistician was not necessary for its 
interpretation.111  Furthermore, the court specifically adopted the cell-by-cell analysis of 
Dr. Larntz’s, which suggests that the race factor is accorded a heavy weight in the 
admissions process.112
The Sixth Circuit assessed the social science data presented in Grutter differently.   
According to the court, the statistical evidence of GPA and LSAT disparities between 
majority and underrepresented minority groups do not present a double standard, as 
109 Id. at 841.
110 Id. at 841-842.
111 Id. at 842.
112 Id.
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suggested by the district court, but are the effect of the Harvard-style “racial plus”.113
This “racial plus” factor was not defined by Justice Powell, nor did Harvard append a list 
comparing minority and non-minority SAT and GPA scores.  Thus, without further 
guidance on what is or is not permissible, the majority holds that “tip[ping] the balance”, 
holding SAT and GPA scores constant then making a coin toss in favor of race, is 
permissible.114
In addition, the concurrence by Judge Clay, joined by Judges Daughtry, Moore, 
Cole, highlights an article in the Washington Post written by Goodwin Liu, a Washington 
attorney and former Supreme Court law clerk, who firmly states that affirmative action 
does not give spaces to minority students at the expense of whites.115 Liu points out that 
Bakke’s scores were not only better than the average minority applicant, but also better 
than the average applicant; thus, suggesting other factors at play, and that Bakke was not 
merely competing for the 16 quota spaces.116
Evidence presented by former Harvard President, Derek Bok suggests that there 
has been little change in this phenomenon since the days of Bakke.  Judge Clay citing 
Bok and William Bowen’s book, The Shape of the River, notes that within the Bowen and 
Bok dataset, eliminating the “racial plus” increases the likelihood of admissions of whites 
113 Grutter, 288 F.3d at 746
114 Id.
115 Id. at 766-768.   
116 Id. According to the Liu article, with the quota Bakke’s probability of admissions was 2.7 
percent (84 spots divided by the 3,109 applicants in the pool).  Without the quota, Bakke’s probability of 
success increases marginally to 3.2 percent or 100 spots divided by 3,109.  For a fuller discussion see 
Goodwin Liu, Affirmative action in higher education: The diversity rationale and the compelling interest 
test, 33 HARVARD CIVIL RIGHTS-CIVIL LIBERTIES LAW REVIEW 381 (1998).
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from 25 to 26.5 percent.117  At the undergraduate level, 60 percent of blacks scoring 
1200-1249 on SAT are admitted as compared to 19 percent of whites.   Ceasin 
affirmative action would increase the admissions rate of whites marginally, from 19 to 21 
percent.  Thus, the issue is not racial preferences to blacks, but the number of applicants 
in the pool competing for limited number of places.118
With respect to the compelling aspects of diversity, Judge Clay quotes extensively 
data on the benefits of a diverse student body presented by Patricia Y. Gurin, Professor of 
Psychology at the University of Michigan and Interim Dean of the College of Literature, 
Science and the Arts, and concludes that the evidence supports diversity as a compelling 
interest. This data seemingly was ignored by the district court in Grutter.   Summing up 
his opinion, Clay states
the legal scholarship has indicated that a diverse student 
body serves to promote our nation’s deep commitment to 
educational equality, provides significant benefits to all 
students – minorities and non-minorities alike, and does so 
using a system which is not foreign to the admissions 
process, but which allows for the benefit of all and not just 
some.  Thus, although the majority does base its holding 
that diversity is a compelling governmental interest on 
Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke, it is clear that contrary 
to the dissent’s criticism, this holding is not without 
foundation even when standing alone.  On the other hand, 
the dissent’s conclusion that diversity cannot serve as a 
compelling state interest for purposes of surviving 
constitutional muster under the Equal Protection Clause, is 
supported by neither legal scholarship nor empirical 
evidence.119
117 Id. See generally, Derek Bowen and William Bok, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER, 1998.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 763-764.
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The district court in Gratz, which ruled in favor of the undergraduate policy, also 
cited Gurin’s work extensively.  Dr. Gurin testified that “students learn better in a diverse 
educational environment, and they are better prepared to become active participants in 
our pluralistic, democratic society once they leave such a setting.”120   Her analysis 
concludes that “students who experienced the most racial and ethnic diversity in 
classroom settings and in informal interactions with peers showed the greatest 
engagement in active thinking processes, growth in intellectual engagement and 
motivation, and growth in intellectual and academic skills.”121
Exploring the role of expert testimony in judicial opinions in the Michigan cases 
highlights the degree to which judges differ in their receptivity to social science evidence 
and differences in gravitation towards experts for plaintiff students and defendant 
educational institutions.  In these cases, more than ten experts plus amici submitted 
evidence,122 with varying quantities and quality of social scientific data, in the Gratz and 
Grutter cases.  By and large, defense witnesses outmatched plaintiffs’ in the quantity of 
experts testifying, their credentials, and their breadth of current scholarship.  Thus on the 
larger of issue of whether racial diversity and its benefits could be considered a 
compelling governmental interest, the defense in the Michigan cases won.123  They won 
120 Gratz, 122 F.Supp. 2d at 822.
121 Grutter, 288 F.3d at 761. Guin’s work, as well as the testimony of other defense expert s in the 
Michigan cases can be found http://www.umich.edu/ ~urel/admissions/legal/. 
122
 For more on the role of amici in the Gratz and Grutter cases, see Jonathan Alger and Marvin 
Krislov, You’ve Got to Have Friends: Lessons Learned from the Role of Amici in the University of 
Michigan Cases, 30 J.C.U.L. 503 (2004). 
123
 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 268 (2003) 
(“For the reasons set forth in Grutter v Bollinger, [citations omitted], the Court has today rejected 
petitioners' argument that diversity cannot constitute a compelling state interest. However, the Court finds 
that the University's current policy, which automatically distributes 20 points, or one-fifth of the points 
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in part because Justice O’Connor was willing to defer to their educational expertise as 
supported by data.124
The use of experts is less extensive in the K-12 cases and plaintiff and defendant 
scholarship is more evenly matched.  As such, it is somewhat easier in this context to 
disengage the effect of motivation in bringing together a team of scholars from the effect 
of the persuasive power of the social science evidence presented.  
In Parents, data presented by the district included a statistical representation of 
racial isolation and de facto segregation in Seattle’s schools.  With the high school choice 
policy only one of the high schools, Garfield, was in racial balance.125  Without the 
policy, the incoming ninth grade classes at the most popular schools were estimated to be 
79.2 percent non-white at Franklin, 30.5 percent non-white at Hale, 33 percent at Ballard, 
41.1 percent at Roosevelt.  In a region where racial and ethnic minorities are in the 
majority, 60 percent, minority students would compose only one-third to 40 percent of 
four of the five preferred high schools.  Under the policy, composition of those classes 
shifted from a range of 40.6 percent to nearly 60 percent.126
needed to guarantee admission, to every single ‘underrepresented minority’ applicant solely because of 
race, is not narrowly tailored to achieve educational diversity.”).
124
 539 U.S. at 328 (“The Law School's educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its 
educational mission is one to which we defer. The Law School's assessment that diversity will, in fact, 
yield educational benefits is substantiated by respondents and their amici.”) (Opinion O’Connor, J.).  For 
further discussion of Justice O’Connor’s deference in Grutter see Angelo N. Ancheta, Contextual Strict 
Scrutiny and Race-Conscious Policy Making,  36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 21 (2004).  Cf.,  Gail Heriot, Thoughts 
on Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger as Law and as Practical Politics, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 137 
(2004).
125 Parents, 137 F.Supp. 2d  at 1226.  Here racial balance meant representative of the general 
Seattle public school system plus or minus 15 percent deviation.
126 Id.
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In addition, the district hired Dr. William Trent, Professor of Educational Policy 
Studies at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champlain, to testify.  Trent presented four 
rationales for pursing the diversity goal, each grounded in data.  First, he contended that 
diversity provides opportunity and experience.  To support his claim, he relied on 
desegregation research suggesting that educational experiences lead to more networking 
in higher education and employment, which is especially beneficial to minority students 
who are isolated from legacy networks.127  Second, he offered that diversity improves the 
achievement of minority students through access to better teachers and advanced 
curriculum.  Both minority and non-minority improve critical thinking skills through 
cross-cultural dialogue.128  Third, Trent asserted that diversity imbues civic values, 
improves race relations, decreases prejudicial attitudes, provides a more democratic, 
inclusive experience for all students, and ultimately works to break down racial and 
cultural classifications.129  Finally, diversity in school works towards societal 
desegregation as employment opportunities improve and minorities, in turn, seek 
suburban housing.130
The plaintiffs called Dr. David Armor, Professor of Public Policy at George 
Mason University, to critique Dr. Trent’s analysis.  But as Dr. Armor ultimately admitted, 
“there is general agreement by both experts and the general public that integration is a 
desirable policy goal mainly for the social benefit of increased information and 
127 Id. at 1236.
128 Id.
129 Id.
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understanding about the cultural and social differences among the various racial and 
ethnic groups.”131 As such, the district court found Dr. Armor’s testimony unsuccessful 
in casting doubt on Dr. Trent’s presentation.132  While the defendants in this case 
prevailed at the district court, at the Ninth Circuit, the court found that the admissions 
policy violated Washington State Law.133
Dr. Trent also testified in the Wessmann case.134  Here, Trent’s analysis focused 
on the lingering effects of past discrimination. 135  Trent presented the results of racial 
climate surveys distributed to teachers, students, and parents in Kansas which found that 
higher teacher expectations correlate with higher student achievement.  On the other 
hand, low teacher expectations correlate with prior discrimination and lower student 
achievement.136 Finding that the Boston School System was previously declared unitary 
and that the lingering vestiges of past discrimination were insignificant, the First Circuit 
130 Id. Charles V. Willie, Professor Emeritus of Education at the Harvard Graduate School of 
Education, presented testimony to the same effect in the McLaughlin case. See McLaughlin, 938 F.Supp. 
1001, 1014.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133
 Referencing Initiative 200.  See supra note 50.
134 Wessmann, 996 F. Supp. 120 (MA 1998), rev’d, 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir.1998).
135 Id. at 804. Note, according to the desegregation decree for Boston Public Schools established 
in Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216, 258 (D. Mass. 1975), aff’d, 530 F.2d 401, 425 (1st Cir. 1976), 35 
percent of seats in the Boston Examination Schools were set aside for black and Hispanic students.  The 
First Circuit lifted the decree in 1987.  See Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d 313, 326 (1st Cir. 1987). Two years 
thereafter, the Boston School Committee elected to continue the 35 percent quota for black and Hispanic 
students.  That policy was the subject of the McLaughlin decision included in this analysis.  McLaughlin v. 
Boston School Committee, 938 F.Supp. 1001 (MA 1996).  The plaintiff, McLaughlin, was ultimately 
enrolled in Boston Latin School, rendering the case moot.  The School Committee, under the advisement of 
the district court in McLaughlin, revised the policy so as to be narrowly tailored.  Narrow tailoring is 
discussed in the section below.  The new policy gave rise to the Wessmann case where the First Circuit 
majority found insufficient evidence to support the diversity claim, despite expert testimony.  
136 Id.
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was not persuaded by Dr. Trent’s testimony.  The First Circuit found this evidence 
inapplicable, as it did not directly address the question of diversity.  Drawing parallels 
from the Supreme Court’s analysis of the City of Richmond’s data mismatch in the 
Croson case, the Court found that research on the vestiges of prior discrimination in 
Kansas did not support the diversity rationale advanced by defendants.137
The court also critiqued the data collected by Trent as well as the testimony of an 
additional expert, finding the testimony of each wanting in methodological quality and 
connection to the diversity justification.138 The primary fault the court found with Dr. 
Trent’s testimony was that a formal evaluation of the Boston school system had not been 
conducted, and that the Boston-specific evidence proffered was based upon less than 
systematic observances and interviews.139  Similarly, the Court found evidence given by 
then Deputy Superintendent Janice Jackson, testifying in an expert rather than 
administrative capacity, regarding the association between teacher expectations and 
student outcomes wanting for lack of scientific rigor.  Extrapolating from Trent’s 
research on Kansas and applying it to the Boston Public Schools, Jackson employed a 
technique called Teacher Expectations and Student Achievement (TEASA), and found 
through observation that teacher expectations of minority students were generally low.140
However, Jackson’s methodology was poorly described and she failed to document 
critical aspects of her observations, such as the number of schools, classrooms, and 
137 Id. at 804-805.
138 Id. at 805-806.  
139 Id.
140 Id. at 806.
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people observed.  As such the Court was concerned, appropriately, about the scientific 
validity and reliability of Jackson’s work.141
The court also heard what it deemed anecdotal testimony from school district 
administrators.  The First Circuit then held that on the basis of the record before the court, 
the case for continued efforts to enroll more students of color in Boston’s prestigious 
examination schools was not compelling.142  Note that the Court’s opinion was not 
unanimous.  Judge Lipez, in dissent, found Dr. Trent’s testimony both relevant and 
compelling in light of the city of Boston’s history of racial discord.143
In Comfort, Dr. Gary Orfield of the Harvard Civil Rights Project submitted an 
affidavit stating that racially mixed education is essential to prepare students to live in a 
pluralistic society.144  In addition, using a comparison of Lynn, Massachusetts School 
District demographic data to other studies conducted by Orfield, there is evidence that 
dismantling the transfer policy’s racial component would detrimentally affect the 
academic performance of minority students.145
141 Id. at 808-807. Based on the Court’s description, Ms. Jackson misemployed qualitative 
research techniques, which, by definition, do not employ numbers as a means of inquiry.  Thus, the Court’s 
critique that she failed to use statistical analysis is inappropriate as qualitative work generally does not 
include statistics.  However, there are methodological standards in qualitative research, and to the extent 
that she failed to recall basics, such as the names of the schools observed and the number of classrooms, it 
was appropriate for the court find her testimony unreliable.  For more information on standards in 
qualitative research see generally, Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, DESIGNING SOCIAL 
INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (1994).
142 Id. at 807.  
143 Id. at 820-829.
144 Comfort, 100 F.Supp. 2d 57, 66.
145 Id.
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Here, Judge Gertner was able to distinguish the case in Comfort from Wessmann 
where the First Circuit held that the diversity inquiry was fact-bound, and given the facts 
before it, could not rule that diversity was a compelling interest.146  No social science 
evidence was proffered on the issue of diversity in the Wessmann case, although experts, 
including Dr. William Trent, testified to the lingering effects of segregation.  Judge 
Gertner found that Professor Orfield’s testimony was directly relevant as the data was 
both specific to Lynn, Massachusetts and was able to link student diversity to educational 
benefits, in particular student achievement. 147  Given Orfield’s testimony, a preliminary 
injunction was averted as plaintiffs could not meet their burden in proving their 
likelihood of success on the merits.148
In sum, in the period between Bakke and the Michigan cases, more plaintiffs won 
race conscious admissions cases.   While there are too few cases from which a general 
pattern can be ascertained, defendant educational institutions persuaded more judges to 
rule in their favor when social science evidence was presented.  When social science 
research is added, the rate of defendant victories improves to 50-50.  As such, the 
addition of social science research allows defendants a “fighting chance,” lending support 
for the continued use of experts at these trials.  
146
 See Id. at 67-68. 
147 Id. at 68. The district court hearing in Comfort was a preliminary matter, which was ultimately 
dismissed on standing grounds.  See Comfort, 131 F.Supp. 2d 253 (MA 2001), 150 F.Supp. 2d 285 (MA 
2001).
148 Id. Judge Gertner also found that with respect to the balance of harms, reassigning students 
across the district was significantly more burdensome than requiring a student to stay in a previously 
assigned school.  Unlike the case in Boston, there were no elite schools at the elementary level in Lynn; 
therefore, the district court reasoned that there was little to no deprivation of an advanced curriculum. Id. at 
69.
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IV. Conclusion: Data-Supported Deference in Grutter and Beyond
Author of the majority opinions in Croson and Adarand, Justice O’Connor 
provided the swing vote in the Court’s 5-4 decision in Grutter, upholding the Michigan 
law school’s race conscious admissions policy.  Since her appointment by President 
Reagan in 1981, O’Connor consistently has maintained a conservative stance in the 
government contracts and employment contexts, voting against each of the race 
conscious policies brought before the Court.  Yet, in the education context O’Connor 
hinted support for race conscious policies, as is heard in her Wygant concurrence.  Even 
in Adarand she holds out that strict scrutiny need not be fatal in fact.  But as Justice 
Ginsberg’s Adarand dissent highlights, O’Connor’s actions suggested otherwise, as 
during O’Connor’s tenure on the Court, she supported no race conscious policy, 
including the one upheld in Paradise.  That was true until Grutter v. Bollinger. 
Overall, O’Connor’s stance on diversity as a compelling governmental interest 
was opaque until her announcement in Grutter.  During the oral argume nts of these cases, 
none of O’Connor’s questions regarded the educational benefits of diversity.  While 
reconciling the sociological concept of critical mass within the context of women in law 
school with the critical mass of African American students on campus, O’Connor’s 
inquiry focused mainly on the narrow tailoring inquiry.  
 In O’Connor’s majority decision in Grutter, she specifically endorsed diversity as 
a compelling interest as proffered by Justice Powell.  Yet rather than announcing that 
diversity was clearly compelling, she deferred to the educational judgment of the 
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University of Michigan based upon the social science evidence presented.149  So here, 
social science did play a role.  It permitted Justice O’Connor the opportunity to see the 
degree to which the University of Michigan thought through its admissions policy and 
Michigan’s willingness to support its educational judgment.  Therefore, it seems that this 
research was just the evidence needed to allow this swing-voting judge to preserve the 
race-conscious admissions option for educational institutions seeking diverse student 
bodies.
In conclusion, while the overall legal developments in the area of race conscious 
admissions suggest that plaintiffs are more likely to win these suits, where most defense 
victories have been made, social science evidence was presented.  In effect, social science 
research seems to give college/ university defendants a fighting chance.  Towards that 
end, counsel should, as feasible, include social science research as part of their defense, 
because one never knows when it may have sway.  That said, I do not think it is efficient 
in subsequent suits to employ the number of social scientists used in the Michigan cases.  
Data is but one means of persuasion, which alone does not assure victory.
Should institutions use the leeway provided by Grutter to continue race conscious 
policies, specific social science indicators of the relationship between diversity and 
educational outcomes as they relate to your campus, your educational purpose and 
mission, should be employed.  In that manner the data folly of The City of Richmond in 
Croson, the utilization of national data to reflect a local condition will be avoided.  How 
149
  See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332(“The Law School's educational judgm ent that such diversity is 
essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer. The Law School's assessment that diversity 
will, in fact, yield educational benefits is substantiated by respondents and their amici.”) Opinion 
O’Connor, J.
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do you develop that data?  Look at your campus and other campuses in your region.  The 
researcher you need may be right under your nose.
